

# Mechanisms to Block the Growing Pricing Power of Hospitals and Health Systems

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**ConsumersUnion<sup>®</sup>**  
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
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# Presentation Overview

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- “It’s the Prices Stupid!”
- Two waves of Provider Consolidation
- How Providers Exercise Market Power to Increase Payments
- Limited Array of “Market-based” Tools to Address Provider Pricing Power
- Setting Prices Administratively – the Options
  - Selective Charge Limits
  - Hospital All-Payer Rate Setting
- Rate Setting Models to forestall Hospital/Health System Pricing Power and Promote Population-Based Health Care Delivery

# Despite Slowing of Cost Growth – Prices are Primary Drivers



Factors Accounting for Growth in Personal Health Care Spending, 1980-2009

Their analysis showed that “prices accounted for more than 60% of the increase in overall spending in 2010”

Martin A, Lassman D, Whittle L, Catlin A. Recession contributes to slowest annual rate of increase in health spending in five decades. *Health Aff (Milbank)* 2011;30(1): 11-22.


“The Health Care Cost Institute (HCCI) reports that payment rates to private insurers grew between **5 percent and 6 percent** per year from 2011 to 2013.

Hospitals in 2013 increased their prices sufficiently to generate **the highest overall profit margins in more than 20 years**, largely, according to MedPAC, because they had the market power to do so”

March 2015 MedPAC report to Congress

# Second Phase Appears to be Occurring since 2009

Since 2009, perhaps in response to uncertainty related to Health Care Reform, safe-harbor protections of the ACA and low cost of capital and distressed standalone hospitals – consolidation is now in a second Phase



# Other Factors and Tactics Help Drive up Prices

- Some economists say – to have continually increases prices – you must have continually increasing consolidation
- However, there **are other factors/tactics** that drive prices:
  - Must “Have Hospitals” and “Must Have” specialty services
  - So-called “Tying” of services & anti-competitive clauses in contracts
  - Multi-hospital systems over large regions (avoid anti-trust scrutiny) but able to negotiate broad price increases for all facilities
  - Relative geographic isolation – particularly in large spread-out geographic areas (Phoenix, AZ)
  - Acquisition of physician practices by hospitals – to increase negotiating leverage for both groups, forestall possible competition by physician-organizations and generate additional “facility fees”
  - Hospitals continually **jack up Charge Levels** – which increases their leverage with insurers and also drives of Payments in certain categories of care

# Limited Array of Market-Based Tools

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- Tiered and Narrow Network Development
  - Haven't taken off largely because Provider Cartels preclude Private Insurers from not featuring them in their Networks
  - Alternative is they are “non-par” and charge the insurer 400%+ of cost for patients they do happen to treat
- Encouraging payment reform that rewards quality and cost effectiveness
- Liberalizing the scope of practice restrictions to allow more efficient use of human resources
- Breaking down regulatory barriers to telemedicine and digital products that enable health management
- Refining anti-kickback rules and payment restrictions to enable innovative, integrated ventures that would change the delivery of care

# Rate Regulatory Approaches

1. Legislate an **“Available and Limited Price”** in situations of greatest anti-competitive activity (Emergency Room care and egregious markups) – specific to the private sector
  - Law similar to the law that applies to MA plans now
  - If an MA plan cannot contract with a health system – defaults to Medicare FFS rates
2. **Traditional Prospective Mandatory State-based All-Payer Hospital Rate Setting Systems**
  - Option A: Prospective Hospital payments based on DRGs and more packaged Outpatient Services (EAPGs) with a system of “Volume Adjustments” to curtail tendency to ramp up hospital volumes
  - Option B: Rochester Style – system of Hospital Global Budgets on an All-Payer basis for States with Populations naturally mapped to individual hospitals (e.g., largely rural states with low population density)
3. System applicable to **Private Payers Benchmarked off of Medicare Payment System** (with a volume adjustment system)

# #2A: Prospective Mandatory Systems

- Seven States Implemented Mandatory Hospital Rate Systems – Four received a “Waiver” from Medicare to create All-Payer Approaches
- Characteristics:
  - Administered by an Independent State Rate Setting Agency
  - Requires a Federal Waiver to Include Medicare and Medicaid
  - Usually based on a Payment Structure such as Per Case (DRGs), Per Episode (Admission & Readmission) or Per Outpatient Encounter (EAPGs)
  - Hospital Approved rates will vary from one hospital to another
  - Once Base Rates are set, they are updated by an approved “Trend Factor”
  - Should include various “adjustments” to rates for differences in case mix, levels of uncompensated care, teaching, labor market differences
  - Use of a “Volume Adjustment System” to curtail incentive to increase volume
  - Strong legal authority to enforce Rate Compliance

# Prospective Mandatory Systems – Pros/Cons

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- Pros:
  - Mandatory Systems: Good Track Record of Controlling Price/Cost Growth
  - Eliminates Anti-Trust concerns associated with hospital mergers
  - Also, improved the equity of payment (narrowed price differences across Payers)
  - Can finance social costs such as Uncompensated care & Teaching Costs
  - Some evidence of slowed Technology Diffusion – but Rate Systems can advance Quality through use of P4P mechanisms
  - Some systems structured to accommodate at-risk or other innovative payment structures such as Shared Savings Programs (SSPs)
- Cons:
  - Viewed as highly regulatory – few states receptive to Government Intervention
  - Systems can become very complex and difficult to understand/administer (Regulatory Failure)
  - Also subject to legal challenges
  - Rate Agencies subject to “Regulatory Capture” by the hospital industry


# # 2B Prospective Mandatory Systems – Global Budgets

- Could be Modeled after very Successful Rochester and Finger Lakes Area “Hospital Experimental Payment Program” (HEPP)
- Best implemented in States or Regions where populations naturally mapped to individual hospital (or groups of hospital) service areas
- Characteristics of Global Hospital Budgets:
  - Rate Agency establishes fixed Global Budgets for hospitals & employed physicians that act as both a Limit and a Guarantee
    - (e.g., Hospital with a \$200 million Global Budget is limited to this amount but also guaranteed this amount regardless of the number of services it provides to patients during the year)
  - Eliminates Fee-for-Service incentives and provides strong incentives for overall Cost Containment (**on a per capita basis**)
  - Budgets trended to future years at some affordable rate (i.e., Growth of GSP)
  - Can be structured to include employed physician revenues
  - Preserves existing Payment “Differentials” across payers but these can be narrowed over time
  - Potentially applicable to smaller hospitals (CAHs) with risk corridors

# Rate Regulatory Global Budgeting System

Vermont's regional system of hospitals makes it well-suited for hospital Global Budgets

Populations are naturally mapped to individual Hospitals



# Global Budget Systems – Pros/Cons

- Pros:

- In Rochester and also in Maryland (2009-2013 and presently) strong cost control
- Eliminates Anti-Trust concerns associated with hospital mergers
- Can improve payment equity & finance social costs
- Creates incentives for hospitals to be efficient in providing services and meeting community needs
- Administratively much easier system to implement and more predictable payments and improved profitability
- Very consistent with alternative payment systems such as ACOs and other SSPs – Global Budgets remove hospital resistance to the success of these programs

- Cons:

- Difficult to implement in large urban areas with multiple hospitals (difficult to align populations to specific hospitals)
- May result in reduction of care/services and lead to waiting lines – Definite need for Strong Quality-based P4P Programs to maintain or improve quality
- May be at odds with specialists' incentives (although should support PCP-based care delivery and payment models)

# #1 – Create an Available Price as a Back Stop to Excessive Charging Practices of Hospitals

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- Hospitals' unlimited ability to raise charges undermines the negotiating leverage of private payers and contributes to higher payment levels
- For Example: in a typical negotiation a Health System faces two equivalent situations (in terms of revenue they can generate)
  - Negotiate a Contract with an Insurer at 250-300% of Medicare and stay a “featured” provider in the Payer’s network – retaining a large volume of the insurer’s beneficiaries
  - Go “non-par” and get a smaller proportion (say 20%) of the patients through their hospital ERs and charge 400%+ of Medicare
- In the end - Health Plans often don’t push back against any of these tactics – and accept the 250%-300% payment levels
- Legislating a “Fall-Back” price level and making it legally available to Payers can help restore Payer/Hospital Negotiating balance

# #1 - Focusing in Areas of Greatest Anti-competitive Behavior

- Evidence from MedPac shows that – this dynamic does not afflict MA Plans - **MA plans are able to negotiate payment levels from large Hospital Systems that are close to Medicare FFS levels**
- This is because MA Plans have a “**back-stop**” – if they can’t get a provider to negotiate reasonable rates, the back-stop is the MA plan pays Medicare FFS rates
- This provides very strong evidence for the need for legislation to set a limit on out-of-network prices paid – particular for ED cases
- This approach is being studied in California where this problem is quite significant and continues to undermine the negotiating leverage of insurers
- State legislatures should pass a law **limiting these out-of-network “balance billing” strategies to 1.5 x Medicare** or less

That is the “Available Price” for any person or plan that might otherwise face full charges

Thank  
You!